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INTRODUCTION
While a sizeable gulf exists between the Trump and Biden
administrations’ approaches to immigration, there is one policy area where
these presidents would see eye-to-eye: a legal pathway for “Dreamers,”
longtime undocumented residents who initially came to the United States as
children. Notwithstanding this exceptional example of bipartisanship, how
the nation now moves forward to create such a pathway is a conundrum.
The political divide that has stalled a two-decades-long search for a
congressional solution has its roots in America’s longstanding ambivalence
about whether and how to provide basic opportunities to the least of its
denizens.
This Article traces the current stalemate over the Dreamers to
earlier disputes about desegregation and public school funding evident in a
trio of landmark cases—Brown v. Board of Education, San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, and Plyler v. Doe—each of
which highlights tensions underlying the Court’s commitments to ensuring
equal protection of the law to minoritized communities. Taking these cases
together, three constitutional tensions emerge: the role of courts versus
political entities (separation of powers), the role of federal versus state
governments (federalism), and the expansive versus restrictive reading of
fundamental equality norms (individual rights). While Plyler v. Doe is
correctly celebrated for providing basic public education to migrant
children,1 subsequent developments have led to a wide-ranging debate over
these persons’ access to opportunities after high school, including
affordable postsecondary education and gainful employment.
This Article then examines the different sides of this debate as
exemplified in the various federal and state policies enacted to address the
issues of education and employment Plyler did not answer, emphasizing the
president’s leadership role in framing the issues. With respect to Dreamers
in particular, the Obama/Biden approach will be compared to and
contrasted with Trump’s policy perspective. Viewing these approaches
from the lens of the three constitutional themes identified earlier—
separation of powers, federalism, and individual rights—this Article argues
that true legislative progress for the Dreamers continues to be an uphill
battle because of the history lessons gleaned from Brown through Plyler.
***
1. See Public Education for Immigrant Students: Understanding Plyler v. Doe, AM.
IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/
plyler-v-doe-public-education-immigrant-students [https://perma.cc/GRV5-MGM5].

2022]

ALL THE PRESIDEENTS’ DREAMERS

319

Joe Biden and Donald Trump. The popular narrative is that the
current occupant of the Oval Office and his predecessor could not be further
from each other in terms of style, temperament, and politics. In perhaps no
policy arena is this philosophical distinction more pronounced than in the
field of United States immigration policy.
When we think of Donald Trump and his views on immigration,2
we think of the birther controversy he stoked around Barack Obama’s
citizenship (impugning Obama’s qualifications for the presidency)3, the
Muslim travel ban,4 the southern border wall,5 the separation of parents and
children,6 and the restrictions on asylum,7 to name a few. When we think of

2. According to longtime Republican operative and Trump confidante, Roger Stone,
“Trump saw that he would have to move right to win the party’s nomination, but this idea
that Roger Stone or Sam Nunberg or Steve Bannon provided him with an agenda is just not
true. Sam deserves a lot of credit for helping Trump frame some of the things he wanted to
say in memorable ways, but it’s all pure Trump. Trump is the one who sees immigration as
an issue, who has been talking about trade imbalances and our NATO allies not paying their
fair share all the way back to 1988. He formulates his own platform, and he road tests it. He
knows where the applause lines are.” ALLEN SALKIN & AARON SHORT, THE METHOD TO HIS
MADNESS: DONALD TRUMP’S ASCENT AS TOLD BY THOSE WHO WERE HIRED, FIRED,
INSPIRED—AND INAUGURATED 274 (2019). To be clear, the fact that I agree with Trump’s
gut reaction regarding the Dreamers does not suggest I agree with any more of his agenda.
Indeed, his draconian immigration policies are likely to have unintended long-term
consequences, especially for border states like California. See, e.g., Molly O’Toole, Trump’s
immigration changes will affect California long after he’s gone, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2020),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-10-15/stakes-for-california-election-immigratio
n [https://perma.cc/UT2K-EKV9]. Elsewhere, I have critiqued parts of the Trump
immigration agenda from a Christian perspective. See Victor C. Romero, Victor C. Romero,
Servant Leadership and Presidential Immigration Politics: Inspiration from the FootWashing Ritual, 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 147 (2019).
3. See, e.g., Adam Serwer, Birtherism and Trump, THE ATLANTIC (May 13, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/birtherism-and-trump/610978/ [https://pe
rma.cc/UT2K-EKV9]. The U.S. Constitution requires that, among other qualifications,
presidential candidates must be “natural born citizens.” U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No
Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the
Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any
Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years,
and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.”) (emphasis added).
4. The Supreme Court upheld the third iteration of Trump’s Muslim travel ban.
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
5. Having prevailed in the Ninth Circuit, the Sierra Club’s challenge to the funding of
the border wall was appealed to the Supreme Court, but then vacated following Biden’s
decision to halt its construction. See Biden v. Sierra Club, 142 S. Ct. 56, 56 (2021)
(“Judgment vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit with instructions to direct the District Court to vacate its judgments. The
District Court should consider what further proceedings are necessary and appropriate in
light of the changed circumstances in this case.”).
6. Teo Armus, The parents of 545 children separated at the border still haven’t been
found, TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.texastribune.org/2020/10/21/donald-trumpimmigration-parents-children-separated/ [https://perma.cc/78PC-GA62].
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Joe Biden, we think of him, at the very least, undoing Trump’s handiwork,
including canning the Muslim travel ban and ending the family separation
policy.8
Despite these differences, there is one policy area that Biden and
Trump would likely agree on, regardless of the wide array of views within
the Democratic and Republican parties on immigration: that America
should see its way clear to providing lawful residence for those
undocumented persons who came to the United States as children. President
Biden’s penchant for these so-called Dreamers is evident in the bill he sent
to Congress on the very first day of his administration.9 Because of pressure
from among his restrictionist flank, including from former chief strategist
Steve Bannon, Donald Trump’s sympathy for the Dreamers is less wellknown. As New York Times journalists Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Michael
Shear reported, however:
Trump had a blind spot, and it terrified Bannon. Trump had
a weakness for the Dreamers, Bannon knew, and if he gave
in to it, it could ruin him. Brought into the United States as
7. Peniel Ibe, How Trump is Making it Harder for Asylum Seekers, AFSC (Nov. 2,
2020), https://www.afsc.org/blogs/news-and-commentary/how-trump-making-it-harder-asyl
um-seekers [https://perma.cc/78PC-GA62].
8. See, e.g., John Hudek & Christine Stenglein, Biden’s immigration reset,
BROOKINGS (Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021/02/19/bidensimmigration-reset/ [https://perma.cc/6RVB-4SRZ] (“While everyone expected him to make
a dramatic break from the hardline policies, inefficiently spent funds, and inhumane
endeavors of his predecessor, Donald Trump, Mr. Biden is not just reversing Mr. Trump’s
policies, but the policies designed and/or administered by previous presidents.”). Biden’s
immigration priorities are also evident in his May 2021 budget proposal for the Department
of Homeland Security, which includes increasing care for migrants while eliminating
funding for Trump’s border wall. See Nick Miroff et al., DHS Budget Would Slash BorderWall Funding, Increase Care for Migrants, WASH. POST (May 30, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/trump-separated-families-payout-biden/2021/10/2
8/832bc50e-382a-11ec-9a5d-93a89c74e76d_story.html [https://perma.cc/NK3B-CBEV].
9. Biden’s inauguration day proposal included pathways to lawful residence not just
for the Dreamers, but for certain TPS (temporary protected status) holders and farmworkers.
Fact Sheet: President Biden Sends Immigration Bill to Congress as Part of His Commitment
to Modernize our Immigration System, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-presid
ent-biden-sends-immigration-bill-to-congress-as-part-of-his-commitment-to-modernize-ourimmigration-system/ [https://perma.cc/C64T-32XT]. Seung Min Kim & Marianna
Sotomayor, As House approves ‘dreamers’ bill, Biden pushes for support amid GOP
resistance in Senate, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/biden-immigration-dreamers-daca/2021/03/18/ebe53a16-87f0-11eb-8a8b-5cf82c3dff
e4_story.html [https://perma.cc/RRA7-5AC3]. Biden has also shifted expenditures away
from Trump’s border wall toward immigrant care. Miroff et al., supra note 9. More
generally, Biden’s spending priorities have been geared toward correcting societal inequities.
Greg Korte & Jacqueline Gu, Biden Targets Racial, Social Inequities With Vast Spending
Push, BLOOMBERG (May 29, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-0529/biden-targets-racial-social-inequities-with-vast-spending-push [https://perma.cc/M3JM-X
78Q].
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children by their parents, this particular group of
undocumented immigrants had tugged at Trump’s
heartstrings since he first found out they existed during his
meeting with several of them at Trump Tower in 2013.10
Trump and Biden are not the only political rivals who can find
common ground with respect to the Dreamers. Both George W. Bush and
Barack Obama, Trump’s and Biden’s predecessors, also supported some
form of permanent residence for the Dreamers.11 Indeed, since 2001,
Congress has seen numerous DREAM Act bills that have come and gone,
often with bipartisan sponsorship.12
Fast forward to 2021. If, in today’s polarized political climate, there
might be widespread support for the Dreamers—indeed, if Trump and
Biden could agree on such reform—why has it not happened? If every
president from Bush the younger through Biden the elder has pushed for
Dreamer documentation since the early 2000s, why hasn’t this gotten done?
This Article contends that three seminal Supreme Court cases on
so-called K-12 primary and secondary public education teach us about three
constitutional tensions that underlie our reluctance to provide equal
protection under the law to the most vulnerable populations in society.
We begin with an exploration of a Supreme Court case that
everyone wants to believe in and affirm—a so-called “super precedent”13—
Brown v. Board of Education,14 which teaches us that, while, like the
Fourteenth Amendment itself, the intentions of this unanimous Court were
noble, the compromised language of its opinion and that of its namesake,
Brown II, reveal a weaker commitment to true equal opportunity for all.15

10. JULIE HIRSCHFELD DAVIS & MICHAEL D. SHEAR, BORDER WARS: INSIDE TRUMP’S
ASSAULT ON IMMIGRATION 156 (2019).
11. See infra Part III.C.
12. See infra notes 111–13 and accompanying text. The terms “DREAM Act” and
“Dreamers” derive from the original name of the proposed act, the Development, Relief, and
Education for Alien Minors Act of 2001. Development, Relief, and Education for Alien
Minors Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001–02).
13. Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1205 (2006)
(“Super precedents are those constitutional decisions in which public institutions have
heavily invested, repeatedly relied, and consistently supported over a significant period of
time.”); Marcia Coyle, Hunting for ‘super precedents’ in U.S. Supreme Court confirmations,
CONST. CTR. (Oct. 20, 2020), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/hunting-for-superprecedents-in-u.s-supreme-court-confirmations [https://perma.cc/LA3E-KBUF] (tracing the
use of the term “super precedent” during Senate confirmation hearings for Supreme Court
justice candidates, most recently Justice Coney Barrett).
14. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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IN THE BEGINNING: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND SAN
ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT V. RODRIGUEZ

Part I of this Article examines two hallmarks of the Supreme
Court’s Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence around our constitutional
commitment to equal educational opportunities for all in the United States.
In the first case, Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court declared
the Jim Crow doctrine of “separate but equal” unconstitutional in the
context of public education.16 In the second, San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, the Court upheld a state’s public school
funding scheme even though it perpetuated socioeconomic inequalities
between rich and poor schoolchildren.17
This Part introduces three constitutional values—the separation of
powers, federalism, and the protection of individual rights—and describes
how these values are manifested in Brown and Rodriguez, highlighting
tensions in our long-term commitment to providing equal public
educational opportunities to all students.18
A. Brown v. Board of Education and the Constitutional Tensions
Underlying this Unanimous Opinion.
1. The Brown Backstory: Getting to Unanimity
Brown v. Board of Education is familiar to every school-aged pupil
in America, and trotted out by social studies teachers nationwide as a
symbol of our democracy’s commitment to equality for all, regardless of
race.19 The political and legal details are similarly familiar to most law
students. Following a long campaign by the NAACP orchestrated by future
Justice Thurgood Marshall in which Jim Crow segregation laws were
successfully challenged at every turn,20 the Supreme Court unanimously

16. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
17. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54–55 (1973).
18. Id. at 1; Brown, 347 U.S. at 483.
19. See Rick Allen, Brown v. Board of Education: How Far Have We Come?, ASCD
(May 1, 2004), https://www.ascd.org/el/articles/brown-v.-board-of-education-how-far-havewe-come [https://perma.cc/DQM6-ZQR5].
20. Mark Tushnet has authored two comprehensive books on Marshall’s constitutional
career, both as a civil rights lawyer and as a jurist. MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS
LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 (1994) (authored as an
attorney); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND
THE SUPREME COURT, 1961-1991 (1997) (authored as a Justice); see JUAN WILLIAMS,
THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY (1998) (describing Marshall’s
desegregation strategy from conception to implementation); GARY M. LAVERGNE, HEMAN
MARION SWEATT, THURGOOD MARSHALL, AND THE LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE (2010)
(describing Marshall’s involvement in the Texas law school desegregation dispute
culminating in the Supreme Court’s decision in Sweatt v. Painter).
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struck down state laws that prevented children of different races from
attending public schools together.21
As a political and legal matter, the unanimous Brown opinion
almost did not happen, having originally been discussed in the context of
both Plessy v. Ferguson’s22 “separate but equal” doctrine and a
constitutional and legislative history that appeared to permit segregation
notwithstanding the Civil War Amendments.23 At the initial oral argument
in 1952, a majority of the Justices seemed skeptical that segregated schools
were unconstitutional, led by Chief Justice Vinson, who expressed the
following sentiments during the Justices' December 13th case conference:
There is a body of law in back of us on separate but
equal. . . . The same men were in Congress then who
passed the Civil War Amendments. However you construe
it, Congress did not pass a statute determining the issue and
ordering no segregation . . . Harlan’s dissent in Plessy is
careful not to refer to schools.24
Indeed, Justice Douglas’s notes indicate a five-to-four split in favor of
upholding Plessy and school segregation.25
It took the death of Chief Justice Vinson—and the appointment of
California Governor Earl Warren as his replacement—to swing the Court to
unanimously rule segregated schools unconstitutional by 1954.26 Following
the case’s 1953 re-argument, Chief Justice Warren shared the following
thoughts with his brethren at conference:
The more I read and hear and think, the more I come to
conclude that the basis of the principle of segregation and
separate but equal rests upon the basic premise that the
Negro race is inferior. That is the only way to sustain
Plessy—I don’t see how it can be sustained on any other
theory. . . . I don’t see how we can continue in this day and
age to set one group apart from the rest and say that they
21. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
22. 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896).
23. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation
Decision, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1, 58 (1955) (concluding that “section I of the fourteenth
amendment, like section i of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, carried out the relatively narrow
objectives of the Moderates, and hence, as originally understood, was meant to apply neither
to jury service, nor suffrage, nor antimiscegenation statutes, nor segregation.”).
24. DEL DICKSON, ED., THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985) 646 (2001)
(emphasis in original).
25. Id. at 660 (“In the original conference, there were only four who voted that
segregation in the public schools was unconstitutional.”).
26. The classic work examining the Brown decision is by historian Richard Kluger.
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (Vintage rev. ed. 2004).
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are not entitled to exactly the same treatment as all others.
To do so is contrary to [the Civil War Amendments].27
According to Justice Douglas, Chief Justice Warren took the laboring oar in
drafting an opinion outlawing school segregation. Warren circulated drafts
to try to persuade the doubters, as the Court collectively strived for
unanimity, clarity, and concision, in anticipation of the resistance the
opinion would face from segregationist elements.28
2. The Constitutional Tensions Underlying Brown I & II
The now-unified Brown Court worked assiduously to issue two
separate opinions in consecutive years: one overruling Plessy’s doctrine of
“separate but equal”29 and—following further re-argument30—the other
outlining a remedy for integrating currently segregated schools.31 Taking
both opinions together, one notices the constitutional tensions underlying
the unanimity forged by compromise.
American law generally recognizes three core principles enshrined
in its written constitution: the separation of powers among the national
government’s branches; the respect for federalism, the co-existence of both
national and subnational governments; and the protection of individual
rights.32 As the primary interpreter of the Constitution,33 the Court has
27. DICKSON, supra note 25, at 654 (emphasis in original). Jarring and offensive as
they appear today, the Justices’ terms for the different races have been left in their original
form, for accuracy’s sake.
28. Id. at 661 (“It was decided by a few of us (Black, Burton, and myself) who worked
closely with Chief Justice Warren on the matter that these opinions should be short and
concise and easily understood by everyone in the country. . . .”).
29. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954).
30. Id. at 495–96 (“Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability
of this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of
decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable complexity. On reargument, the
consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary question -the constitutionality of segregation in public education. We have now announced that such
segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full
assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and
the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously
propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term. The Attorney General of the United
States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or
permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae
upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October 1,
1954.”).
31. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 294 (1955).
32. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1-6 (5th ed. 2015) (describing the Constitution’s functions as creating a national government
of separate powers, dividing power between state and federal governments, and protecting
individual liberties); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Giving Meaning to the Preamble, CONST.
CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/preamble-ic/interps
/37#giving-meaning-to-the-preamble-by-erwin-chemerinsky [https://perma.cc/9WN3-B6E
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recognized that tensions exist in adjudicating disputes in which these
principles arise.34 Leading constitutional law scholar Erwin Chemerinsky
has eloquently noted that “[v]iewing the Constitution as a way of protecting
long-term values from short-term passions poses a basic problem in
constitutional interpretation. Interpretation is crucial to allow a document
written for an eighteenth-century agrarian slave society to govern in the
technological world of the twenty-first century.”35 In Brown I & II, we see
all three principles, and their underlying tensions, at play.36
3. Separation of Powers
First, let’s consider the separation of powers doctrine. Following
the failure of the Articles of Confederation,37 the Framers established a
national government and separated its powers via the first three articles of
the Constitution.38 Wary of lodging political power in a single entity, the
Founders described the distinct powers held by each of the three branches:
the legislature or Congress in Article I, the executive or President in Article
II, and the judiciary or Supreme Court in Article III.39 Through its landmark
decision in Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court conferred upon itself
the power of judicial review over the political actions of the legislature and
executive, securing its position as the final arbiter over the Constitution’s
meaning.40 In sum, the nation’s political branches—Congress and the

U] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021) (“The Preamble describes the core values that the
Constitution exists to achieve: democratic government, effective governance, justice,
freedom, and equality.”).
33. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (noting that it is the Court’s duty “to
say what the law is.”).
34. See Joel B. Grossman, The 200th Anniversary of Marbury v. Madison: The
Reasons We Should Still Care About the Decision, and The Lingering Questions It Left
Behind, FINDLAW (Feb. 24, 2021), https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/the200th-anniversary-of-marbury-v-madison.html [https://perma.cc/GL72-JV36].
35. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 33, at 8–9.
36. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954); Brown, 349 U.S. at 294.
37. See, e.g., NCC Staff, 10 reasons why America’s first constitution failed, CONST.
CTR. (Nov. 17, 2020) https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/10-reasons-why-americas-firstconstitution-failed [https://perma.cc/Y2AN-ZPBT] (“The Articles formed a war-time
confederation of states, with an extremely limited central government. The document made
official some of the procedures used by the Congress to conduct business, but many of the
delegates realized the Articles had limitations.”); GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, WE HAVE
NOT A GOVERNMENT: THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND THE ROAD TO THE
CONSTITUTION 2 (2017) (“[T]he true heart of the controversy over the Confederation’s
collapse was whether Americans were willing to transfer sovereignty—tax and law
enforcement powers—to a central government.”).
38. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1; id. art. III, § 1 (creating the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of the national government).
39. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1; id. art. III, § 1.
40. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and
duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
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President—create and execute laws for the good of the American people,
while the nation’s judicial branch—the Supreme Court—ensures that such
laws comply with the Constitution, but cannot itself create any law.
In Brown I, we see the tension between political lawmaking and
judicial interpretation play out in the Justices’ conference debates about
how to correctly interpret the constitutional phrase “equal protection of the
laws” as it applies to the question of segregated schools.41 As constitutional
interpreters, the Justices were interested in the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment to gauge whether the founding generation would
have permitted segregation notwithstanding their commitment to equality
following the end of the Civil War.42 In his Brown I opinion, Chief Justice
Warren noted that the historical source material was “inconclusive.”43
The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments
undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions
among “all persons born or naturalized in the United
States.” Their opponents, just as certainly, were
antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the
Amendments and wished them to have the most limited
effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures
had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of
certainty.44
As is true with any large group, there were different views on what
equality for the newly-freed slaves meant. What is undisputed, however, is
that, among several states and Washington, D.C.,45 schools at the time of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s passage were legally segregated by race.46
This inconvenient truth generated a robust debate among the Justices during
particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with
each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of each.”).
41. See History – Brown v. Board of Education Re-enactment, U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/educational-activities/history-brown-v-boar
d-education-re-enactment [https://perma.cc/46H7-HAUY] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021).
42. Id.
43. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 488–89 (1954).
44. Id. at 489.
45. Bolling v. Sharpe was the companion case to Brown I that involved segregated
schools in Washington, D.C. As in Brown I, the Court held these separate schools
unconstitutional, relying on the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (“In view of our decision [in Brown I] that the
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it
would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government. We hold that racial segregation in the public schools of the District of
Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution.”).
46. Desegregation and Busing: The Fourteenth Amendment, FINDLAW (June 20,
2016), https://www.findlaw.com/education/discrimination-harassment-at-school/desegregati
on-and-busing-the-fourteenth-amendment.html [https://perma.cc/H82Q-BYXG].
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the conferences as to the proper role of the judge versus that of the political
branches.
To wit, because judges are supposed to interpret law and not create
it, would ignoring the history of segregated schools during the passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment mean that the Court was substituting its
political judgment for that of the Framers who clearly thought segregated
schools permissible? Justice Jackson argued:
I would start with these cases as a lawyer would. I find
nothing in the text that says [segregation] is
unconstitutional. Nothing in the opinions of courts say that
it is unconstitutional. Nothing in the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment says that it is unconstitutional.
There is nothing in the acts of Congress either way. On the
basis of precedents, I would have to say that it is
constitutional.47
Justice Frankfurter agreed. “As a pure matter of history, in 1867 the
Fourteenth Amendment did not have as its purpose to abolish segregation.48
The due process and equal protection clauses certainly did not abolish
segregation when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.”49
In these Justices’ view, separation of powers required judges to
function primarily as lawyers—that is, to examine the textual, historical,
and precedential evidence before them, all of which pointed to the
inescapable fact that maintaining segregated schools was a widespread
practice at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was passed.50 If changes
were to be made to that educational policy decision, those were to be made
by the political branch. Namely, Congress in the case of Washington, D.C.,
and state legislatures otherwise. That the Court relied, in part, on
contemporaneous “psychological knowledge”51 to support its conclusion
that the harms caused by segregation was similarly controversial. Such
evidence is typically weighed by legislatures as part of their policy-making
function.52
Other Justices did not see their interpretive duty as bound solely to
the historical record, instead viewing the Equal Protection Clause as setting
forth a flexible standard that can be adapted to modern times.53 As Justice
Douglas implored his colleagues:

47. DICKSON, supra note 25, at 652 (emphasis in original).
48. Id. at 657.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 652, 657.
51. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954); see also id. at 494 n. 11 (citing
various studies).
52. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 33, at 738.
53. See DICKSON, supra note 25, at 658.
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History does shed a mixed light on [segregation]. In this
day and age, race and color can’t now be salient. Don’t try
to anticipate too much. We should recognize that
adjustments will have to arise. This Court this Term is
deciding its principles. It is a simple problem. Race and
color cannot be a constitutional standard for segregating the
schools.54
Justice Clark minimized the historical record by characterizing Congress’s
failure to abolish segregation as an unfortunate political reality given
conditions in the South. “I can’t well say Congress has ignored
[desegregation]. They did not do it because southern congressmen could not
do anything in the District of Columbia that would integrate the District of
Columbia. People couldn’t vote to integrate here and then return home to
the South.”55 In these Justices’ views, history was an informative, but not
binding, tool and changed circumstances could warrant a changed
interpretation of an open-ended constitutional text like the Equal Protection
Clause.56
In the end, the separation of powers debate was resolved in favor of
a broad reading of the Fourteenth Amendment keyed to the realities of
1954, not 1868. As the unanimous Brown I opinion concluded:
We cannot turn the clock back to 1868, when the
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896, when Plessy v.
Ferguson was written. We must consider public education
in the light of its full development and its present place in
American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can
it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives
these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.57
Noting that “education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments,”58 Brown I overruled Plessy, noting that “in the field of
public education, the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal.”59
To achieve unanimity, Chief Justice Warren and his allies had to
persuade the objectors that their separation of powers concerns had to be
put aside, and that there was a valid constitutional basis for this ruling,
notwithstanding the mixed history.60 Although he acquiesced in this
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 659.
See id. at 658–59.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954).
Id. at 493.
Id. at 495.
See DICKSON, supra note 25, at 658.
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unanimous approach, Justice Jackson noted his unease: “The problem is to
make a judicial basis for a congenial political conclusion. . . . As a political
decision, I can go along with it—but with a protest that it is politics.”61
One important lesson from the Brown debate is that, despite the
unanimous opinion in favor of desegregation, the Justices had differing
views on the separation of powers question.62 Indeed, Justice Jackson
appears to have gone along with the majority, notwithstanding his view
that, as a constitutional matter, the Court’s decision was a political one best
left for legislatures, not one that the judiciary was fit to adjudicate given the
lack of clear constitutional text and history outlawing segregation.63
4. Federalism
Next, turning to the principle of federalism. Given the tremendous
growth of the federal government since the New Deal,64 it is often difficult
to imagine that the states’ power was paramount at the Founding, with subfederal governments the primary sources of positive law.65 As such, those
wary of the new Constitution were particularly concerned about
overreaching federal power, expressed most emphatically during the
ratification debates.66 As Chemerinsky notes, “Antifederalists, who opposed
the ratification, emphasized the powers of the new national government and
its ability to relegate state governments to a secondary and relatively
unimportant role.”67 Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked the
Tenth Amendment as a textual source for the protection of states’ rights
against an increasingly large federal bureaucracy.68
In Brown I, the Court acknowledged that some school districts had
begun working on equalizing facilities, curricula, and teacher salaries of the
white and Black segregated schools, and in some cases, had achieved the
same.69 Accordingly, the Justices were aware that their decision to overturn
61. Id.
62. See id. at 657–58.
63. See id. at 658.
64. See, e.g., IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR
TIME (2014); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL
(2009); JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1974
(Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed. 1997).
65. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 33, at 9.
66. Id. at 11.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding the “take
title” provision of federal waste act unconstitutional on federalism grounds); see also Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (striking interim provisions of federal Brady Act
as usurping state power over local law enforcement officials); see also Reno v. Condon, 528
U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (upholding federal driver’s protection act against Tenth Amendment
challenge).
69. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) (“[T]here are findings below that
the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with
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the doctrine of “separate but equal” had to be grounded in a theory that
presupposed equal, but separate, facilities.70 Such a moral decision—that
segregated schools were inherently unequal—substituted the federal
judiciary’s view of morality for that of the states.
While the Court ultimately concluded such segregation stamped a
badge of inferiority upon Blacks,71 Justice Reed presented the Southern
states’ view in conference:
Segregation is not done on a theory of racial inferiority, but
on racial differences. It protects people against the mixing
of races. The argument was not made that the Negro is an
inferior race. . . . [O]n equal protection, they demonstrably
have equal protection. [The states’ commitment to
segregation] is a police power that has been exercised.
Its purpose has been to maintain a policy status.72
Under our federalist system, the argument goes, if states are in
charge of enacting laws that reflect the health, safety, welfare, and morals
of their communities,73 the federal government—via an unelected federal
judiciary, no less—should not be able to substitute its judgment for that of
states.74 As Justice Reed reminded his brethren, “States are authorized to
respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other ‘tangible’
factors.”). While the Court also acknowledged the growing importance of public education
since the Civil War, it should be noted that such growth was spurred on by state legislatures.
See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Sutton, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and Its
Aftermath, 94 VA. L. REV. 1963, 1965 (2008) (“At the founding, there were no state-wide
systems of public schools, and, if there were schools at all, they were privately run or
haphazardly organized at the local level. Sparked by the virtuous (and occasionally not-sovirtuous) leadership of Horace Mann and the ‘Common Schools’ movement he launched in
Massachusetts, States in the mid-nineteenth century began to authorize their cities and
counties to organize schools that would offer a free public education. To that end, they
frequently amended their constitutions, requiring the legislature (in the words of many a
state constitution) to create a ‘thorough and efficient’ system of public schools.”).
70. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492 (“Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a
comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the
cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education.”).
71. Id. at 494.
72. DICKSON, supra note 25, at 656.
73. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 33, at 709 (“At the very least, the government has a
legitimate purpose if it advances a traditional ‘police’ purpose: protecting safety, public
health, or public morals.”).
74. While few would question whether racially-segregated schools are constitutional
today, my experience teaching Constitutional Law suggests that many understand the
arguments for single-sex education, for instance, even if those tend to arise in private
settings. See, e.g., ROSEMARY SALOMONE, SAME, DIFFERENT, EQUAL: RETHINKING SINGLESEX SCHOOLING 35 (2003) (“As I visited these three schools . . . I was struck by the orderly
learning environment, the challenging academic program, the high expectations set for
students, the consistently articulated and pervasive values and strict code of behavior, and
the commitment and enthusiasm of the teachers. Obviously, all of these elements can be
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make up their own minds on this question. . . . We must start with the idea
that there is a large and reasonable body of opinion in various states that
separation of the races is for the benefit of both.”75
Given this perceived violation of federalism that the Brown I
opinion might invoke, the Court aimed to reassure these disparate states of
its commitment to respecting the local authority over educational policy76 in
its remedial opinion in Brown II.77 In Brown II, the Court pragmatically
realized that it might stem segregationist school districts’ resistance to
Brown I by placing these local governments in charge of implementing
integration, albeit with federal court oversight.78 Chief Justice Warren
wrote:
School authorities have the primary responsibility for
elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts
will have to consider whether the action of school
authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the
governing constitutional principles. Because of their
proximity to local conditions and the possible need for
further hearings, the courts which originally heard these
cases can best perform this judicial appraisal. Accordingly,
we believe it appropriate to remand the cases to those
courts.79
In its remand order, the Court required the lower courts and school
districts to facilitate desegregation with “all deliberate speed.”80 A
pragmatic approach perhaps, but one that sent a mixed message, for the
word “speed” suggests haste, whereas the term “deliberate” demands
caution.81 What is clear is that the lower courts were to retain jurisdiction
and oversight, ensuring that whatever plans the school districts adopted
sought to achieve the integration principles set forth in Brown I.82

replicated in a coeducational setting. But there is something else in all three [single-sex]
schools is that almost intangible yet nonetheless powerful and definitive. There is a
spontaneity, a synergy, an emotional security, and a sense of community that seem to flow
out of shared experiences and common purposes as young women.”).
75. DICKSON, supra note 25, at 649.
76. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955) (“Because these cases arose
under different local conditions and their disposition will involve a variety of local problems,
we requested further argument on the question of relief.”).
77. Id. at 249.
78. See id. at 299–300.
79. Id. at 299.
80. Id.
81. DICKSON, supra note 25, at 669 n. 92 (Dickson credits Richard Kluger, who
apparently traces “all deliberate speed” to an 1893 poem by Francis Thompson).
82. Brown, 349 U.S. at 301 (“During this period of transition, the courts will retain
jurisdiction of these cases.”).
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Notwithstanding the Justices’ best efforts to convey unanimity via
Brown I & II,83 the Southern states’ response to this perceived federal
encroachment was uniformly negative.84 As Chemerinsky has noted, “State
legislatures adopted resolutions of ‘nullification’ and ‘interposition’ that
declared that the Supreme Court’s decisions were without effect. State
officials attempted to obstruct desegregation in every imaginable way.”85
Like the separation of powers issue, the federalism debate
underlying the Court’s unanimous decisions in Brown I & II86 led not only
to massive resistance from Southern states resentful of federal judicial
interference in their constitutional police power over education, but also
revealed fault lines in the Court’s commitment to equal protection that we
will see make subsequent contested five-to-four cases like Rodriguez87 and
Plyler88 less surprising than one might have expected. Put differently, while
Brown lives in our popular culture as a beacon of America’s robust
constitutional commitment to equal educational opportunities for all, the
separation of powers and federalism debates that underlie the otherwise
unanimous opinion reveal a Court less committed to educational equity than
a cursory reading of Brown—and its modern mythical, super-precedent
status—might suggest.89
5. Individual Rights
Finally, let’s examine the debate about how Brown aimed best to
protect individual rights.90 That the Constitution was intended to protect
individual rights is perhaps the best known of the three great principles,
even though its textual foundations tend to be sought in the document’s
amendments, not its main articles.91 Understandably then, Brown is best
known for its moral conclusion that laws that require the separate education
of children by race are inherently unequal, even if the facilities they attend
could be made equal.92 In today’s culture, Brown is also known for an even
broader proposition—racial segregation is unlawful and all so-called Jim
Crow laws requiring the same are unconstitutional.93
83. Id. at 294; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954).
84. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 33, at 752.
85. Id. For more on the Southern states’ massive resistance to Brown I & II and the
Court’s subsequent cases enforcing the same, see id. at 752–57.
86. Brown, 347 U.S. at 483; Brown, 349 U.S. at 294.
87. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
88. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
89. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 33, at 735–36.
90. See generally Brown, 347 U.S. at 486–96.
91. U.S. CONST., amends. I–X (the so-called “Bill of Rights”). For a comprehensive
and creative account of the individual amendments and their interrelationship, see AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
92. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 33, at 736–37.
93. See, e.g., Jim Crow Laws, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (May 1, 2014),
https://eji.org/news/history-racial-injustice-jim-crow-laws/ [https://perma.cc/83TQ-L8NS].
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While few today would think Justice Reed’s arguments are
constitutionally valid,94 there was a sizable body of law arguing that
separating the races was good for both, and that segregation did not, by
itself, render one race inferior to the other.95 As Justice Brown argued in
Plessy v. Ferguson:
Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in
places where they are liable to be brought into contact do
not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the
other, and have been generally, if not universally,
recognized as within the competency of the state
legislatures in the exercise of their police power. The most
common instance of this is connected with the
establishment of separate schools for white and colored
children, which has been held to be a valid exercise of the
legislative power even by courts of States where the
political rights of the colored race have been longest and
most earnestly enforced.96
Indeed, a short time after the Brown decision, Professor Herbert
Wechsler concluded that all that the Justices achieved was to favor the
associational rights of Blacks over that of whites.97 Wechsler wrote:
For me, assuming equal facilities, the question posed by
state-enforced segregation is not one of discrimination at
all. Its human and its constitutional dimensions lie entirely
elsewhere, in the denial by the state of freedom to
associate, a denial that impinges in the same way on any
groups or races that may be involved.…But if the freedom
of association is denied by segregation, integration forces
an association upon those for whom it is unpleasant or
repugnant. Is this not the heart of the issue involved, a
conflict in human claims of high dimension, not unlike
many others that involve the highest freedoms…? Given a
situation where the state must practically choose between
denying the association to those individuals who wish it or
imposing it on those who would avoid it, is there a basis in
neutral principles for holding that the Constitution demands
that the claims for association should prevail? I should like
to think there is, but I confess that I have not yet written the
94. DICKSON, supra note 25, at 649, 656–57.
95. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
96. Id.
97. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959).
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opinion. To write it is for me the challenge of the schoolsegregation cases.98
In Wechsler’s view, if the Court truly believed that it was possible to make
the educational opportunities of Black and white children equal, then the
only reason to prefer integration to segregation was to favor certain
associational preferences, not to articulate neutral equality principles.99
Put differently, Brown should be read as privileging the associational
preferences of (Black) integrationists100 over those of (white)
segregationists.101
In response, Professor Charles Black argued that there is a much
simpler way of understanding the individual rights principles at stake in
Brown.102 Contrary to Wechsler’s assertions, the neutral principle is not
associational freedom but racial equality.103 Black wrote:
The [F]ourteenth [A]mendment forbids inequality, forbids
the disadvantaging of the Negro race by law. It was surely
anticipated that the following of this directive would entail
some disagreeableness for some white southerners. The
disagreeableness might take many forms; the white man,
for example, might dislike having a Negro neighbor in the
exercise of the latter's equal right to own a home, or dislike
serving on a jury with a Negro, or dislike having Negroes
on the streets with him after ten o'clock. When the directive
of equality cannot be followed without displeasing the
white, then something that can be called a ‘freedom’ of the
white must be impaired. If the fourteenth amendment
commands equality, and if segregation violates equality,
then the status of the reciprocal ‘freedom’ is automatically
settled.104
Black believed that the associational freedoms of segregationists give way
to those of integrationists not because of some arbitrary coin flip, but
because the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause mandates
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. Note that not all Black people, then and now, preferred integration. Indeed,
Professor Derrick Bell has argued that better schools for Black children should have
received primary focus over integration. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 533 (1980)
(“[E]ffective schools for blacks must be a primary goal rather than a secondary result of
integration.”).
101. See id. at 518–21; see also Wechsler, supra note 98, at 34.
102. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421, 421 (1960).
103. See id. at 428–29.
104. Id. at 429.
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that racial minorities be treated as equals under the law.105 Maintaining
segregated schools violates that neutral principle of racial equality and
therefore cannot be sustained per Brown.106
The lesson from this debate—like those gleaned from the debates
underlying separation of powers and federalism—is that smart people can
divine individual rights principles that favor the Jim Crow segregationist as
well as the progressive integrationist. Had the Court favored robust
individuality or the freedom of Southern whites to segregate, then it could
have upheld Plessy as consistent with constitutional principles. Thus, a
segregationist vision of equal protection would have supported legislative
majorities that ensured the equal, albeit separate, existence of the races on
the neutral principle of free association.107
***
Notwithstanding Brown’s deserved stature in the canon of revered
Supreme Court opinions, the constitutional tensions underlying the debates
around separation of powers, federalism, and individual rights should give
modern readers pause. While Brown I is breathtaking in its rhetoric and
sweeping in its commitment to racial equality, Brown II is more measured,
evidenced by its weak command that the states pursue integration with “all
deliberate speed.”108 We will see these same debates come to a head in the
Rodriguez school finance case, which exposes the Court’s less-than-robust
commitment to equal educational opportunity for poor minority children, a
scant twenty years after Brown was decided.109

105. Id. at 428–29.
106. See id. at 426.
107. Again, this alternate reality may seem difficult to defend modernly, but recent
studies suggest that, despite America’s increasing racial diversity, residential segregation has
increased over time. See, e.g., Tracy Hadden Loh et al., The Great Real Estate Reset—
Separate and unequal: Persistent residential segregation is sustaining racial and economic
injustice in the U.S., BROOKINGS (Dec. 16, 2020) https://www.brookings.edu/essay/trend-1separate-and-unequal-neighborhoods-are-sustaining-racial-and-economic-injustice-in-the-us/
[https://perma.cc/QJ4U-48RL] (“[W]hile our cities and regions are becoming far more
racially and ethnically diverse, segregation has remained persistent.”).
108. Compare Brown v. Bd of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955), with Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 482, 495–96 (1954).
109. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Legacy and Implications of San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 17 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 515, 516 (2014) (“The
Supreme Court's school desegregation case law has been a confusing maze of fits and starts.
In 1954, a unanimous Court declared in Brown v. Board of Education that education ‘must
be made available to all on equal terms.’ Yet, less than 20 years later, the Court found a
Texas education financing plan that allowed for significant differences in funding between
school districts to be constitutional.”) (internal citations omitted).
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B. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
In Rodriguez, a group of lower-income, predominantly MexicanAmerican parents110 brought suit against Texas, claiming that the state’s
school funding system violated the Equal Protection Clause.111 Unlike the
unanimous Brown opinion, Justice Powell’s majority decision persuaded
the bare minimum of four other Justices to sign on, signaling a retreat from
the earlier precedent’s robust protection of minority students’ educational
rights.112 A former Southern school board member himself,113 Justice
Powell concluded that neither the plaintiffs’ lack of wealth nor their desire
for equal educational opportunity triggered the Court’s strict review of
Texas’s financing scheme.114
While acknowledging that Texas’s localized school district funding
and control led to great disparities in the quality of schools between rich
and poor communities, under the Equal Protection Clause, poverty was not
a suspect class nor was education a fundamental right.115 Accordingly, the
majority deferred to Texas’s funding scheme which, while imperfect,
satisfied rational basis review.116
110. Despite the predominant racial composition of the plaintiff class, the Court
ultimately concluded that there was no deliberate discrimination along racial lines in this
case. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 57 (1973) (“Nor does it now
appear that there is any more than a random chance that racial minorities are concentrated in
property-poor districts.”).
111. Id. at 4–6.
112. Id. at 1.
113. Joan Biskupic & Fred Barbash, Retired Justice Lewis Powell Dies at 90, WASH.
POST (Aug. 26, 1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/
supcourt/stories/powell082698.html [https://perma.cc/63KU-KUS2] (“Powell developed a
deep friendship with Virginia Sen. Harry F. Byrd and served as chairman of the Richmond
School Board from 1952 to 1961. Soon after he joined the school board, the Supreme Court
issued its ruling in Brown v Board of Education, declaring segregated school systems
unconstitutional. Virginia, like other southern states, operated a dual school system.”).
114. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
115. Id. at 18 (“[W]e find neither the suspect-classification not the fundamental-interest
analysis persuasive.”).
116. Id. at 40 (“[T]his is not a case in which the challenged state action must be
subjected to the searching judicial scrutiny reserved for laws that create suspect
classifications or impinge upon constitutionally protected rights.”). The Court’s interpretive
framework for its equal protection analysis emerged from the infamous footnote 4 of
Carolene Products. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as
those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth. . . . It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation
which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under
the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation. . . . Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious, . . .or national, . . . or racial minorities . . . : whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
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As in Brown, we see the three principles of separation of powers,
federalism, and the protection of individual rights at play here, with
emphasis on the last two.117
With respect to the separation of powers, Rodriguez differs from
Brown in that the allegations were purely state-based.118 Nonetheless, the
concern over unelected judges intruding upon legislative educational policy
decisions remains. Justice Powell recognized the danger of judges using
their interpretive Article III powers to substitute their policy preferences for
the reasoned judgments of policymakers.119 He wrote:
In its essential characteristics, the Texas plan for financing
public education reflects what many educators for a half
century have thought was an enlightened approach to a
problem for which there is no perfect solution. We are
unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of wisdom
superior to that of legislators, scholars, and educational
authorities . . . .120
Reminiscent of Justice Jackson’s admonition during the Brown
Justices’ conferences that lawyers interpret, not make, laws,121 Justice
Powell was careful that his views of school financing as a judge would not
interfere with other views of school financing more properly made by a
school board member or state legislator.122 Horizontal separation of powers
means that each government entity has its own specific function.123
Citing its earlier decision in Shapiro v. Thompson, Justice Powell expressed
his desire that the Court not become a “super-legislature.”124
Closely related to this horizontal separation of powers is the
vertical one, bounded by federalism—the idea that federal judges should
not blithely interfere with state decisions, even where federal constitutional
claims are raised.125 As Justice Powell wrote:
It must be remembered . . . that every claim arising under
the Equal Protection Clause has implications for the
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.”)
117. See generally Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1, 4–6, 18, 28, 40.
118. Recall that Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), a companion case to Brown,
involved the segregated federal District of Columbia schools.
119. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55.
120. Id.
121. See generally DICKSON, supra note 25.
122. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55.
123. Richard Albert, The Separation of Higher Powers, 65 SMU L. REV. 3, 6 (2012).
124. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 31 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661
(1969)).
125. See id. at 44; see also Albert, supra note 124, at 6.

338

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9: 2

relationship between national and state power under our
federal system. Questions of federalism are always inherent
in the process of determining whether a State's laws are to
be
accorded
the
traditional
presumption
of
constitutionality, or are to be subjected instead to rigorous
judicial scrutiny. While ‘(t)he maintenance of the principles
of federalism is a foremost consideration in interpreting
any of the pertinent constitutional provisions under which
this Court examines state action,’ it would be difficult to
imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our
federal system than the one now before us, in which we are
urged to abrogate systems of financing public education
presently in existence in virtually every State.126
Perhaps because of his experience as a Richmond, Virginia school
board member, Powell was particularly alert to the implications of the
Court substituting its views for those of not just Texas, but of the other
forty-nine states whose school financing systems have developed
adequately, albeit imperfectly, without federal oversight.127 Unless there
was an overarching federal or constitutional reason to venture into the field
of state school financing systems, the majority was unwilling to interfere.128
Perhaps even more important to the Court than the vertical and
horizontal separation of powers concerns was the question of individual
rights protected under the Equal Protection Clause.129 It is to this question
that the five-to-four Rodriguez split opinions devote the greatest amount of
ink. On the majority’s side, Justice Powell and his brethren were unmoved
by neither claims of wealth discrimination nor the deprivation of a
fundamental right to education.130
After reviewing three different ways in which wealth
discrimination might manifest in this case, the majority concluded that,
standing alone, poverty is not a suspect status.131 For the majority, Justice
Powell wrote:
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it
defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness:
the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected
to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 44 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 55.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 28.
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command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process.132
Put differently, unlike the Black schoolchildren in Brown, the Texas
students’ poverty “has not occasioned an absolute deprivation of the desired
benefit.”133
As to education as a fundamental right, Justice Powell, while
affirming Brown, also noted that:
Education . . . is not among the rights afforded explicit
protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find
any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected. As we
have said, the undisputed importance of education will not
alone cause this Court to depart from the usual standard for
reviewing a State's social and economic legislation.134
Because the majority held that wealth is not a suspect class and education is
not a fundamental right, the Court was free to apply its most deferential
standard of review to the Texas plan.135 Justice Powell explained, “in sum,
to the extent that the Texas system of school financing results in unequal
expenditures between children who happen to reside in different districts,
we cannot say that such disparities are the product of a system that is so
irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory.”136
The four dissenters vehemently disagreed with the majority’s
conclusions, from the lack of importance given to educational opportunities
to poor children to the failure to recognize the gross inequalities wrought by
Texas’s taxing regime.137 Justice Marshall opined:
[T]he majority’s holding can only be seen as a retreat from
our historic commitment to equality of educational
opportunity and as unsupportable acquiescence in a system
which deprives children in their earliest years of the chance
to reach their full potential as citizens. The Court does this
despite the absence of any substantial justification for a
scheme which arbitrarily channels educational resources in
accordance with the fortuity of the amount of taxable
wealth within each district.138

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 54–55.
See id. at 62–133.
Id. at 70–71.
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Channeling Brown, Justice Marshall would have protected the right to
education for underprivileged youth—whether poor or minority—139 via a
broad reading of equality under the law.140
Likewise, Justice White believed that the facts on the ground
supported Marshall’s conclusion:
The difficulty with the Texas system, however, is that it
provides a meaningful option to Alamo Heights and like
school districts but almost none to Edgewood and those
other districts with a low per-pupil real estate tax base. In
these latter districts, no matter how desirous parents are of
supporting their schools with greater revenues, it is
impossible to do so through the use of the real estate
property tax. In these districts, the Texas system utterly
fails to extend a realistic choice to parents because the
property tax, which is the only revenue-raising mechanism
extended to school districts, is practically and legally
unavailable.141
Note that the dissenters were one vote away from preserving Brown’s
legacy.142 Had one other majority Justice agreed with Marshall and White’s
analysis, states nationwide would have been required to do more to ensure
localities provided disadvantaged children basic educational opportunities
rather than leave unchecked glaring socioeconomic inequalities between
rich and poor families.143
C. Lessons Learned—Constitutional and Political
After reviewing both cases, we learn that Rodriguez signaled a not
entirely unpredictable departure from Brown. Much to the chagrin of the
four Rodriguez dissenters, the bare, five-Justice majority appeared to beat a
hasty retreat from the Brown Court’s unanimous, robust protection of
educational rights for the underprivileged less than twenty years prior.144
Yet, a closer look at the Brown opinion and its individual Justices’
conference notes reveals a spirited debate about fundamental constitutional
139. Camille Walsh has argued that the Court should not have separated the two
statuses of race and class, but rather should have understood their intersectional interplay as
constitutionally significant. See Camille Walsh, Erasing Race, Dismissing Class: San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 21 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 133, 134
(2011) (“[B]y subsuming race under class by artificially separating the two identities, the
Supreme Court negated both claims.”).
140. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 71 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 64–65 (White, J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 1.
143. See id. at 69 (White, J., dissenting).
144. See generally id. at 4–59.
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principles involving the separation of powers, federalism, and individual
rights’ protections.145 Viewed in this light—and knowing that a unanimous
opinion in Brown was unlikely had Chief Justice Vinson not been replaced
by Earl Warren—Rodriguez may be viewed as the triumph of the minority
view implicit in the earlier Brown conference debates.146 Mindful of its
powerful role as constitutional arbiter, the Supreme Court is reluctant to
substitute its policy views for those of legislative decision makers—
whether federal or state—even if that means a severely diminished public
education for a disadvantaged group.147
II. THE HIGH-WATER MARK: PLYLER V. DOE
About ten years after Rodriguez, the Court decided Plyler v. Doe,
widely considered the high-water mark of undocumented persons’ rights,148
which, like Brown, struck down state efforts to deprive schoolchildren of a
basic public education.149 Originating in Texas like Rodriguez, Plyler
involved a state law that barred undocumented children from attending
primary and secondary public schools for free.150 Like Rodriguez, Plyler
resulted in a bare five-to-four majority decision; however this time, in favor
of the students against the state.151
As a matter of equal protection, Plyler is a curious case because,
like Rodriguez, the majority did not find the undocumented children to be a
suspect class,152 nor did it overturn Rodriguez’s holding that education is
not a fundamental right.153 Yet, Justice Brennan’s majority opinion appears
to apply a higher standard of review than Justice Powell’s Rodriguez

145. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
146. See id. at 486; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 31.
147. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 3, 38.
148. MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, NO UNDOCUMENTED CHILD LEFT BEHIND 8 (2012) (“To a
large extent, Plyler may also be the apex of the Court’s treatment of the undocumented, a
concept that never truly existed until the 10th century.”). In my view, Professor Olivas’s
book is the definitive study of the Plyler case.
149. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
150. Id. at 205 (“The question presented by these cases is whether, consistent with the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Texas may deny to undocumented
school-age children the free public education that it provides to children who are citizens of
the United States or legally admitted aliens.”).
151. DICKSON, supra note 25, at 763 (“William Brennan, writing on behalf of a 5-4
majority, struck down the state law.”).
152. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223 (“Undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect
class, because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a ‘constitutional
irrelevancy.’”).
153. Id. at 221 (“Public education is not a ‘right’ granted to individuals by the
Constitution.”) (citation omitted).
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opinion did,154 prompting the four dissenters to wonder whether sufficient
deference was accorded the state.155
So why did the Plyler Court hew more closely to Brown than
Rodriguez,156 arguably providing greater protection for undocumented
children than for poor citizen children? Through our examination of the
three constitutional themes of separation of powers, federalism, and
individual rights protection, we will see how the Brennan majority likely
saw the undocumented in Plyler as more like the Black schoolchildren in
Brown than the disadvantaged San Antonio pupils in Rodriguez, fearing
that Texas’s exclusionary law would create a permanent underclass
effectively deprived of a basic public education by the state.157
First, we consider the separation of powers concerns raised by the
Justices in conference. Justice White, who had previously sided with the
Rodriguez plaintiffs against Texas, thought that Plyler raised national
concerns because of the undocumented children’s alienage.158 As such,
Congress was the proper lawmaking authority to address any disadvantages
they faced, not the Court.159 White argued, “It’s a national and not a state
problem. The state has no obligation to do anything for illegals. Make
Congress do it under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.”160
In contrast, Justice Stevens thought it proper for the Court to intervene,
given the children’s innocence and the federal government’s laissez-faire
attitude toward their undocumented presence.161 Stevens opined, “These
kids are not being deported, but will remain. What then is the treatment for
these innocents? Judges as a whole would not attribute the fault of their
parents (in migrating illegally) to them.”162 In Justices White’s and
Stevens’s arguments, we see the separation of powers tension arise in the
context of immigrants’ rights.163 When a problem arises concerning such
migrants, these Justices differed on whether the proper decision maker
should be Congress (as lawmaker) or the Court (as interpreter of
constitutional equality).164

154. Id. at 224 (noting that Texas statute will not be deemed “rational unless it furthers
some substantial goal of the State”).
155. Id. at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
156. See id. at 203; San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 3 (1973);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
157. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 12; Brown, 347 U.S. at 487.
158. DICKSON, supra note 25, at 762.
159. Id.
160. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). As was my approach to prior
citations, while I personally object to the term “illegals,” I have left the term in for
accuracy’s sake.
161. DICKSON, supra note 25, at 763.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 762–63.
164. Id.
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Like horizontal separation of powers concerns, governmental
division of authority plays out in a vertical sense in the Justices’ arguments
around federalism. Justice Rehnquist saw the issue as a state concern
arising out of Texas’s proximity to Mexico.165 He asserted: “There are
intractable problems in the Southwest. Wetbacks or not, the question is the
validity of Texas’s policy choice, however unwise. We are not talking only
about five- or six-year-olds.”166
Justice Powell offered the Equal Protection Clause as constitutional
authority for the Court’s federal intervention into a traditional state
function.167 He noted: “On equal protection, I would recognize that the
classification is children and that they have no responsibility for being
there. It is hard to think of a category more helpless than the children of
illegal aliens.”168
Justice Blackmun contended that preemption might be an
alternative basis for asserting federal supremacy here. He argued: “These
children are likely to remain. The statute is founded on alienage, not
domicile. I can affirm [in the plaintiffs’ favor] on preemption rather than
equal protection. But I can go on either.”169
Professor Michael Olivas has also made the case for federal
preemption in Plyler, having written that “we do not want state or local
school board policies that turn on federal immigration classifications.”170
The preemption alternative would have given states the option to regulate
educational policy on grounds other than alienage—by domicile, say, as
Justice Blackmun noted—thereby avoiding encroaching upon federal
prerogatives.
In the end, however, it was an appeal to the protection of individual
rights that perhaps made Plyler seem most like Brown for the five Justices
in the majority.171 A key to understanding the Brown-Plyler parallel comes
from a close reading of Justice Powell’s views, as he was the author of
Rodriguez and could very well have sided with Texas as he did in that prior
case.
At conference, while affirming his belief that education was not a
fundamental right,172 Powell nonetheless empathized with the plight of
undocumented children, opining, “I don’t think education is a fundamental
right, but if some children get it I can’t see how they can deny it to
165. Id. at 763.
166. Id. Wetback, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
wetback [https://perma.cc/C33N-TA3R] (last visited Jan. 7, 2021) (the term “wetback” is
“used as an insulting and contemptuous term for a Mexican who enters the U.S. illegally.”).
167. DICKSON, supra note 25, at 762.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. OLIVAS, supra note 149, at 27.
171. Id.
172. See DICKSON, supra note 25, at 762 (“I don’t think that education is a fundamental
right . . .”).
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others.”173 For Powell, Texas’s substandard funding scheme disadvantaging
poor students was categorically different from its decision to effectively174
prohibit innocent undocumented children from attending altogether.175 Such
a bar made the Plyler case much more like Brown than Rodriguez.
Indeed, Justice Brennan highlighted this analogy in his majority
opinion:
In addition to the pivotal role of education in sustaining our
political and cultural heritage, denial of education to some
isolated group of children poses an affront to one of the
goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of
governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to
advancement on the basis of individual merit.
Paradoxically, by depriving the children of any disfavored
group of an education, we foreclose the means by which
that group might raise the level of esteem in which it is
held by the majority. . . . What we said 28 years ago in
Brown v. Board of Education . . . still holds true: “Today,
education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. . . .”176
Furthering this theme, Justice Blackmun’s concurrence highlighted
the consequences of denying a basic education to an identifiable group of
outsiders:177
Children denied an education are placed at a permanent and
insurmountable competitive disadvantage, for an
uneducated child is denied even the opportunity to achieve.
And when those children are members of an identifiable
group, that group—through the State's action—will have
been converted into a discrete underclass.178
Just as the unanimous Brown Court was concerned about relegating
Black children to the status of permanent outsiders, so did the five-Justice
majority in Plyler believe that the same fate would befall innocent
173. Id.
174. I have added the word “effectively” because the Texas statute did permit local
authorities to charge undocumented students tuition to attend the public schools, which,
while not the same as an outright bar, had the same effect. For instance, the largest Texas
school district, Houston, would permit undocumented children to enroll at a tuition cost of
one thousand dollars per child. See OLIVAS, supra note 149, at 10 (noting Houston’s tuition
rate for the undocumented).
175. Id. at 26–27.
176. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222–23 (1982).
177. Id. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
178. Id.
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undocumented children whose status was a product of their parents’ prior
conduct, not theirs.179
In dissent, Chief Justice Burger minced no words in lambasting the
majority for overplaying its hand to protect a sympathetic plaintiff,
particularly where no suspect class or fundamental rights are at play.180
Chief Justice Burger opined:
[B]y patching together bits and pieces of what might be
termed quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights
analysis, the Court spins out a theory custom-tailored to the
facts of these cases . . . . If ever a court was guilty of an
unabashedly result-oriented approach, this case is a prime
example.181
***
In reflecting upon Brown, Rodriguez, and Plyler, we see that both
their outcomes and their underlying rationales are not as obvious as they
might appear.182 In thinking about the three constitutional principles at play
in each case—the separation of powers, federalism, and the protection of
individual rights—why are the debates underlying these constitutional
questions so heated?
One might start by considering the views of two Justices as they
grappled with Brown’s implications in Rodriguez and Plyler. Justice
Powell, who penned Rodriguez183 yet sided with the Plyler majority,184 on
the one hand, versus Justice White, who dissented in both Rodriguez185 and
Plyler.186
Powell saw Plyler’s undocumented children as proper heirs to the
Brown legacy because, like the Black schoolchildren in Brown, they were
effectively barred from a basic public education, whereas the poor
Rodriguez plaintiffs were not.187 Justice White, on the other hand, thought
that the Rodriguez plaintiffs were effectively handicapped in the same
manner as the Brown students because the former’s poverty worked to
disadvantage them much in the same way as the latter’s race, whereas

179. Id. at 220.
180. Id. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
181. Id.
182. See id.; San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
183. Rodriguez, 411 U.S at 4.
184. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205.
185. Rodriguez, 411 U.S at 63 (White, J., dissenting).
186. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 242 (White, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 226; Rodriguez, 411 U.S at 18–19.
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undocumented immigrant students’ troubles were not the states’ making or
concern, but Congress’s.188
Surely, both Justices Powell and White believed in the three
constitutional tenets of separation of powers, federalism, and individual
rights protection, but just as surely, both believed that their own particular
application in each case was correct, transforming a unanimous, though
itself politically and legally contested, opinion in Brown into a much closer
call in Rodriguez and Plyler.189 Put differently, despite its current superprecedent status, the unanimity behind Brown masked a highly-contested
debate about the three constitutional principles that later came to the fore in
the fractured opinions in Rodriguez and Plyler.
By reflecting upon Justices Powell’s and White’s disparate views
along with the fierce debates underlying the proper roles of judge and
Congress (separation of powers), of the federal government and the states
(federalism), and of the Constitution as a source of explicit and implicit
rights (individual rights protection), we come to appreciate the uncertainty
in relying on this founding document as a source of educational equity
when viewed through the lens of an even larger, more diverse group of
Supreme Court Justices, each with their particular views on these
foundational constitutional issues.
Indeed, this uncertainty suggests three lessons from Brown,
Rodriguez, and Plyler.190 First, the Equal Protection Clause is of limited
value in ensuring a level playing field for all, even with respect to basic
educational rights the government provides. Second, legislation is a more
plausible vehicle for ensuring equality (which, for noncitizens, may mean
Congressional action to ensure national uniformity). Third, as exemplified
in the distinct approaches of Powell and White, the Justices’ divergent
views on the status of noncitizen children in American society suggest
that—even if Trump and Biden might agree on the plight of the
Dreamers—lawmakers in Congress may find it difficult to achieve common
cause. We will see these three lessons at play as we examine post-Plyler
legislative developments in the next Part.
III.

PLYLER’S LEGACY: THE DREAMERS GO TO COLLEGE

Notwithstanding Brown and Plyler, the Court made no further
promises to students—undocumented or citizen—beyond a free, basic K-12
public education. The Rodriguez Court’s view on education—that it is not a
fundamental or constitutionally-protected right—191 has prevailed, creating
188. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 242 (White, J., dissenting); Rodriguez, 411 U.S at 64–65
(White, J., dissenting).
189. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230;
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 58.
190. See Brown, 347 U.S. 483; Plyler, 457 U.S. 202; Rodriguez, 411 U.S 1.
191. Rodriguez, 411 U.S at 3.
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a gap for those wishing to pursue post-secondary schooling or employment.
In the realm of post-secondary public funding, United States citizenship and
lawful immigration status make a difference.192
United States citizen children and lawful residents enjoy postsecondary education and employment opportunities denied to the
undocumented.193 While they qualify for K-12 public education nationally
under Plyler, undocumented children who desire a post-secondary
education do not qualify for federal financial aid.194 Similarly,
undocumented children who want to work after high school are generally
unauthorized to do so, and their would-be employers are subject to
sanctions under federal law for providing such opportunities.195
I recall hearing about the frustration the Plyler K-12 ceiling on
post-secondary access to education and employment has had on central
Pennsylvania’s undocumented youth from Carmen Medina. At the time,
Medina served as the Executive Director of the Adams County Delinquency
Prevention Program, a state-sponsored initiative designed to attend to the
needs of school-age children in south central Pennsylvania.196
While perhaps best known as the site of the Battle of Gettysburg,
Adams County is also an agricultural powerhouse, producing more apples
and peaches than virtually any other area of the United States.197 Because of
its agrarian economy, Adams County is also home to a large number of
Mexican farmworkers, many of whom came to this country without proper

192. For more on the difference that citizenship makes, I recommend Linda Bosniak’s
provocative work on the subject. See LINDA J. BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND ALIEN: DILEMMAS
OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP (2006) (noting the ambivalence societies have toward
noncitizens in their midst).
193. Victor C. Romero, Postsecondary School Education Benefits for Undocumented
Immigrants: Promises and Pitfalls, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 393, 393–96 (2002).
194. Many non-U.S. citizens qualify for federal student aid, FED. STUDENT AID,
https://studentaid.gov/understand-aid/eligibility/requirements/non-us-citizens [https://perma.
cc/29AX-BZPW] (last visited Dec. 19, 2021) (outlining categories of non-United States
citizens eligible for federal financial aid, which excludes the undocumented). Even DACA
recipients are ineligible for federal financial aid. Financial Aid and Undocumented Students:
Questions and Answers, FED. STUDENT AID (Apr. 2021), https://studentaid.gov/sites/default/
files/financial-aid-and-undocumented-students.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9MZ-FBKT] (“As an
undocumented or DACA student, am I eligible for federal student aid? No. Undocumented
students, including DACA students, are not eligible for federal student aid. However, you
may be eligible for state or college financial aid, in addition to private scholarships.”).
195. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) et seq. (2011) (provisions regarding the unlawful employment
of noncitizens. This section was part of President Reagan’s Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 (IRCA), whose primary goal was “to increase border security and establish
penalties for employers who hired unauthorized immigrants.”); Musaffar Chishti et al., At Its
25th Anniversary, IRCA's Legacy Lives On, MIGRATION POL’Y INITIATIVE (Nov. 16, 2011),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/its-25th-anniversary-ircas-legacy-lives [https://perm
a.cc/LFC8-VDWR].
196. The following narrative is a slightly reworded version of a story I first told in an
earlier essay. Romero, supra note 193, at 393–96.
197. Id. at 393–94.
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work or immigration papers, their young children in tow, in search of a
better life.198
It is with these farmworkers’ children that Medina’s office was
most concerned. Aside from providing these children with social, cultural,
and educational support, Medina’s office also strongly encouraged them to
work hard at school so that they may maximize their opportunities after
high school.199 Over time, however, Medina had grown increasingly
uncomfortable dispensing such advice. By her estimate, ninety-seven
percent of these children were undocumented like their parents;
therefore, these children were effectively barred from pursuing
postsecondary education because of their undocumented status, their
poverty, or both.
These two factors—undocumented status and poverty—work in
tandem to preclude many undocumented children, like most in Adams
County, from pursuing a college degree. This led Medina to comment
sarcastically that all her program did was to help create a class of welleducated farmworkers.200
Unfortunately, Ms. Medina’s story resonates nationwide. In a 2003
study, demographer Jeffrey Passel estimated that 65,000 undocumented
students who have lived in the United States for at least five years graduate
annually from American high schools.201 The Plyler ceiling is a real one for
tens of thousands of undocumented high school graduates who wish to
work, study, and become productive contributors to the nation they call
home, notwithstanding where they were originally born.
In this Part, we see how the federal and state governments have
acted to both remedy these problems at times, while fighting to maintain the
status quo at others. This inconsistency around the undocumented should
come as no surprise, as it reflects American’s historical ambivalence toward
new immigrants, who have been less welcomed in some quarters, as the
United States undergoes a dramatic demographic shift to a majorityminority nation.202

198. Id. at 394.
199. Id. at 394–95.
200. Id. at 396.
201. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & DAVID B. THRONSON, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY 1452 (7th ed. 2019).
202. See, e.g., Douglas S. Massey, The New Immigration and Ethnicity in the United
States, 21 POPULATION AND DEV. REV. 631, 632 (1995) (“According to demographic
projections, Americans of European descent will become a minority in the United States
sometime during the next century, and this projected shift has already occurred in some
urban areas, notably Los Angeles and Miami. In other metropolitan areas, such as New
York, Chicago, Houston, and San Diego, the transformation is well underway. This
demographic reality suggests the real nature of the anti-immigrant reaction among nonHispanic whites: a fear of cultural change and a deep-seated worry that European Americans
will be displaced from their dominant position in American life.”) (internal citation omitted).
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A. Federalist Restrictionism under Clinton—IIRAIRA 505
This may come as unwelcome news to some progressives, but
modern restrictions against state governments’ ability to extend Plyler-like
opportunities to undocumented college students in the form of in-state
tuition were blocked by Congress under Democrat Bill Clinton’s watch.203
The primary vehicle for this restrictionist measure was Section 505a of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA).204 The Act provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an alien who
is not lawfully present in the United States shall not be
eligible on the basis of residence within a State (or a
political subdivision) for any post-secondary education
benefit unless a citizen or national of the United States is
eligible for such a benefit (in no less an amount, duration,
and scope) without regard to whether the citizen or national
is such a resident. 205
By its terms, this provision prohibits states from granting in-state college
tuition benefits to undocumented students who reside in-state unless that
benefit is extended to all citizen and lawfully permanent non-residents.206
For a majority of states, this provision poses no problem, as most states
deny undocumented students in-state resident status for college tuition
purposes.207 For a few immigrant-friendly states, however, creative workarounds became necessary, as discussed in the next section.
B. Filling the Gaps: State Initiatives (and a Federal one, too!)
Because of IIRIRA Section 505’s “residence” restriction, at least
twenty states—and the District of Columbia—have extended Plyler’s
promise to undocumented college students by basing in-state tuition
eligibility on other factors instead.208 As immigration law scholars Steve
Legomsky and Dave Thronson have noted:
203. Heidi Timmerman, Dare to Dream Act: Generation 1.5 Access to Affordable
Postsecondary Education, 39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 67, 69–70 (2011).
204. Id.
205. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),
8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2015). Groups such as Human Rights Watch have long lamented the
Clinton Administration’s anti-immigrant initiatives, including IIRIRA and the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See US: 20 Years of Immigrant Abuses Under 1996 Laws, Arbitrary Detention, Fast-Track Deportation, Family Separation, HUM.
RTS. WATCH. (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/25/us-20-years-immigrant
-abuses# [https://perma.cc/J9L4-RF8N].
206. Timmerman, supra note 204, at 70.
207. LEGOMSKY & THRONSON, supra note 202, at 1452.
208. Id. at 1453.
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To conform with IIRIRA, these states, rather than base
eligibility on ‘residence,’ require undocumented students to
have attended a school in the state for a certain number of
years, graduated from a high school in the state, and signed
an affidavit pledging to apply for lawful permanent
residence at the earliest opportunity.209
As a practical matter, the target beneficiary of such requirements remains
the undocumented even while the federal residence bar remains in place.210
On the employment front, while states cannot thwart federal
mandates penalizing unauthorized employment, they have the power to
grant professional licenses as they see fit.211 For instance, a number of
states have recently permitted undocumented law students who pass the bar
exam to be admitted as lawyers.212 Similarly, Legomsky & Thronson note
that California, Illinois, New Mexico, and Nevada “have passed laws
allowing noncitizens to be eligible to apply for professional and
occupational licenses.”213
C. Obama/Biden v. Trump—The Presidents and the Dreamers
The drawback, of course, to all the state initiatives in the prior
section is that none has had a national effect, leaving many undocumented
students in limbo. One obvious solution, as Presidents Biden and Trump
both recognized, would be for Congress to pass a law that provided
permanent relief for the now-college-age Plyler beneficiaries, according
legal status to innocents who consider the United States their home.214 Such
bill initially took shape as the Development, Relief, and Education for
Alien Minors Act, known since then as the DREAM Act, and was first
introduced during the Bush Administration in 2001.215
Given the close vote in Plyler, the debate in the states around instate college tuition for the undocumented, and the divisive politics around
undocumented migration more generally, it’s perhaps no surprise that the
DREAM Act has never passed.216 Despite the lesson from Brown,
Rodriguez, and Plyler that legislative reform—and federal law in
209. Id. (citation omitted).
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., Bruce Goldman, How Unauthorized Immigrants Are Fighting To
Practice Law, LAW 360 (Aug. 11, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1186579/howunauthorized-immigrants-are-fighting-to-practice-law [https://perma.cc/55YZ-C57C].
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. For a comprehensive study of the DREAM Act, I recommend Michael Olivas’s
recent work. See MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, PERCHANCE TO DREAM: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL
HISTORY OF THE DREAM ACT AND DACA (2020).
216. Id. at 38. (“The federal stage has . . . been active following the introduction of the
DREAM Act in 2001, but this is a tale of legislative failure.”).
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particular—would be the constitutional solution to undocumented
children’s claims, Congress has not found its way to passing even this
rather modest corrective measure that was championed by every president
since Bush.217
Encountering even more furious opposition to his legislative
agenda than his predecessor,218 President Obama famously provided
DREAM-“lite” relief to some Plyler beneficiaries via his Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program of 2012.219 Recalling our
constitutional law principles, it’s important to note that, unlike Clinton’s
IIRIRA Section 505 restriction on in-state tuition for the undocumented or
Bush’s proposed DREAM Act, Obama’s DACA was not a legislative
product, but an administrative initiative.220
Styled as a form of “deferred action,” DACA aimed to provide
some prior Plyler beneficiaries who continued without status to have their
deportations deferred while providing them opportunities to work and
study.221 This innovation kept open the chance for them to legalize should
the opportunity present itself in the future.222
217. Id. at 46 (Professor Olivas is correct that, as a practical matter, even if the
DREAM Act was to pass, it would affect individual undocumented students’ immigration
status only, not the myriad of state issues related to educational policy. Olivas notes, “[E]ven
if legislation passed tomorrow, it would not affect the ability of states to grant resident
tuition, to enable them to award state scholarships and grants, and to allow them to withhold
enrollment.” My point is not to suggest the DREAM Act as a cure-all, but to suggest that it
levels the national playing field between those lawfully and unlawfully present.).
218. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, The Victory of ‘No’: The GOP’s unprecedented antiObama obstructionism was a remarkable success. And then it handed the party to Donald
Trump, POLITICO (Dec. 4, 2016) https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/republica
n-party-obstructionism-victory-trump-214498/ [https://perma.cc/YAM7-ZA2Q] (“What has
distinguished the opposition to Obama is not just the intensity—a GOP congressman
shouting ‘You lie!’ during a presidential address, Senate Republican leader Mitch
McConnell’s admission that his top priority was limiting Obama to one term—but the
consistency. Before Obama even took office, when official Washington was counseling
cooperation and moderation for a party that seemed to be on a path to oblivion, Cantor and
McConnell laid out their strategies of all-out opposition at private GOP meetings.”).
219. For the latest guidance on DACA, see Consideration of Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals, USCIS, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-of-deferredaction-for-childhood-arrivals-daca [https://perma.cc/X92P-PQXM] (last visited Dec. 19,
2021).
220. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),
8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2015); DREAM Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001);
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as
Children (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorialdiscretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/XTP8-9B55].
221. See generally Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, supra
note 220.
222. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, supra note 220 (“On
June 15, 2012, the secretary of Homeland Security announced that certain people who came
to the United States as children and meet several guidelines may request consideration of
deferred action for a period of two years, subject to renewal. They are also eligible for work
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A discretionary form of relief, undocumented beneficiaries between
the ages of fifteen and thirty qualified if they: (1) came to the United States
before age 16; (2) continuously resided in the United States since June 15,
2007; (3) were then in school, had graduated from high school, had
obtained a GED, or had been honorably discharged from the Armed
Services; and (4) had not committed any of a specific list of crimes and
posed no threat to national security or public safety.223 As of March 2018,
over 800,000 applicants have received DACA relief.224
Despite the program’s relative success, both legal225 and political
attacks against the DACA program ensued.226 Indeed, the more recent legal
attacks stemmed from a sea-change in presidential politics. After President
Trump succeeded President Obama, he proceeded to undo many of his
predecessor’s executive initiatives, including unraveling DACA.227
Although many issues regarding DACA were litigated within the context of
the Administrative Procedure Act,228 shades of the three constitutional
norms identified earlier seemed to lie just beneath the surface.
First, separation of powers concerns were raised regarding the
scope of Obama’s presidential power to authorize DACA. Some viewed
DACA as a legislative act reserved for Congress (via the DREAM Act,
say). Relatedly, for the Obama administration to decline prosecution would
authorization. Deferred action is a use of prosecutorial discretion to defer removal action
against an individual for a certain period of time. Deferred action does not provide lawful
status.”); see also SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES (2015) (Professor Shoba Sivaprasad
Wadhia is the nation’s leading scholar on deferred action and DACA).
223. LEGOMSKY & THRONSON, supra note 202, at 807.
224. Id.
225. See Litigation Related to Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), NAT’L
IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Oct. 21, 2021), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/
litigation-re-DACA-2021-10-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YPN-U6Q] (provides a periodicallyupdated review of all DACA-related litigation); Rachel Treisman & Vanessa Romo, The
Biden Administration Vows To Appeal A Federal Ruling Deeming DACA Unlawful, NPR
(July 17, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/07/16/987132269/federal-judge-rules-dacaunlawful-but-current-recipients-safe-for-now [https://perma.cc/23FB-CP3B] (federal district
court issued a summary judgment order declaring DACA illegal when first adopted; that
ruling is expected to be appealed to the Fifth Circuit).
226. See, e.g., Molly Ball, How Immigration Hardliners Are Forcing Trump’s Hand on
DACA, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/
08/how-immigration-hardliners-boxed-trump-in-on-daca/538623/ [https://perma.cc/3VE3-Q
RL9].
227. See, e.g., Muzaffar Chishti and Jessica Bolter, Trump Administration Rescinds
DACA, Fueling Renewed Push in Congress and the Courts to Protect DREAMers,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/trumpadministration-rescinds-daca-fueling-renewed-push-congress-and-courts-protect-dreamers
[https://perma.cc/E2GJ-Z5LT].
228. The most recent Supreme Court decision on DACA is Department of Homeland
Security v. Regents of the University of California, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1916 (2020), holding
that DHS Acting Secretary violated the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to consider
the consequences of prolonging DACA or accommodating certain recipients’ reliance
interests.
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arguably violate the president’s obligations under the Take Care Clause to
ensure that federal immigration laws were faithfully executed.229
Second, as to federalism, states like Texas challenged a proposed
DACA expansion and a similar program for undocumented parents—the
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
(DAPA) program—because of their adverse effects on state economies.230
Specifically, Texas alleged that because it subsidized state driver’s licenses,
DAPA would lead to an increase in the number of previously
undocumented Texas residents who would now be eligible for statesubsidized licenses.231
Third, DACA recipients alleged that Trump’s rescission decision
was based on anti-Latinx animus, citing the former President’s pre-and
post-election statements.232
With Joe Biden’s inauguration, steps were taken to restore the
DACA program to full strength on his very first day in office.233 Indeed, in
commemoration of DACA’s signing day in 2012, Biden issued the
following statement urging Congress to pass his comprehensive
immigration reform bill, which includes relief for the Dreamers:
Twenty years ago, Congress introduced the first version of
the bipartisan Dream Act, led by Senator Durbin (D-IL)
and former Republican Senator Hatch. And over the years,
bipartisan coalitions of lawmakers championed this bill.
The American public overwhelmingly supports this
229. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, The DREAM Act, and the Take
Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781 (2013).
230. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 152–53 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally
divided Supreme Court, 136 U.S. 2271 (2016).
231. Id. at 155 (“If permitted to go into effect, DAPA would enable at least 500,000
illegal aliens in Texas to satisfy that requirement with proof of lawful presence or
employment authorization. Texas subsidizes its licenses and would lose a minimum of
$130.89 on each one it issued to a DAPA beneficiary.58 Even a modest estimate would put
the loss at ‘several million dollars.’”). The Fifth Circuit found that Texas had standing to
proceed on this claim of economic injury and ultimately affirmed the lower court’s
injunction against DAPA and the proposed DACA expansion. See id. at 188 (“The district
court did not err and most assuredly did not abuse its discretion. The order granting the
preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED.”).
232. Id. at 1916 (“[R]espondents contend that President Trump made critical statements
about Latinos that evince discriminatory intent. But, even as interpreted by respondents,
these statements—remote in time and made in unrelated contexts—do not qualify as
‘contemporary statements’ probative of the decision at issue.”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
140 S. Ct. at 1915–16 (the Court did not find President Trump’s racist rhetoric sufficiently
probative).
233. Memorandum on Preserving and Fortifying Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA), 2021 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 64 (Jan. 20, 2021) (“The Secretary of
Homeland Security, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall take all actions he
deems appropriate, consistent with applicable law, to preserve and fortify DACA.”).
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legislation. But time and time again, the Senate has failed
to act. Only Congress can provide a permanent legislative
fix to provide lasting stability for these young people and
their families. My immigration bill, the U.S. Citizenship
Act, creates a pathway to citizenship for undocumented
individuals in our country, including Dreamers. In March,
the House took a critical first step and passed the American
Dream and Promise Act. Congress must find a way to pass
these legislative solutions and I will continue to work
towards passage of legislation protecting Dreamers and
creating a path to citizenship for undocumented
immigrants. These young people represent the best of
America and we can’t let them down.234
While it would be easy to mistake the Obama/Biden v. Trump
DACA dispute as being about the Dreamers, we have learned from our
study of Brown, Rodriguez, and Plyler to look a bit closer. Just as Brown
was not about America’s unequivocal commitment to public education for
all despite the Court’s unanimity, and Plyler was not about a robust
commitment to undocumented students of all ages, neither has this recent
brouhaha over DACA been primarily about immigrant rights.
As shown above, DACA, in particular, has been about separation of
powers concerns, particularly around the role of the President versus that of
the Congress in providing immigration relief to the Plyler plaintiffs’
successors, the Dreamers. Just as Rodriguez reminds us that our constitution
yields no fundamental right to an education nor heightened equal protection
for poor students, presidents as diverse in their perspective as Biden and
Trump can agree that Dreamers deserve to be recognized for their loyalty to
America, and not stigmatized for their undocumented status, should give us
hope.
Unfortunately, Biden and Trump are only two actors in this legal
and political drama. The constitutional tensions underlying the Brown,
Rodriguez, and Plyler cases remind us that providing educational and
employment opportunities for young people in our midst will continue to be
a political battle.

234. Statement by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. on DACA Day, 2021 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 511 (June 15, 2021). Most recently, the Democrats incorporated immigration
reform as part of its $3.5 trillion social policy proposal; that plan was thwarted when the
Senate parliamentarian ruled against its inclusion as part of the bill reconciliation process.
See, e.g., Luke Broadwater, Democrats Dealt a Blow on Immigration Plans, N.Y. TIMES,
(Sept. 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/19/us/politics/immigration-citizenship.
html [https://perma.cc/9ANK-3PTQ].
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CONCLUSION
It is indeed a sad commentary on our politics when even modest
proposals for Congressional action on bipartisan issues such as the DREAM
Act continue to gain little purchase. However, the current divisions in our
society are complex. In a recent op-ed for the New York Times, conservative
columnist Ross Douthat argued that while many believe the current leftleaning national mood may be a backlash against Trumpism, the country
was moving toward progressivism anyway.235
On the other hand, many Latinx and Asian American immigrant
communities voted for Trump over Biden.236 More generally, the
ideological divide over issues like race and immigration, worse than even
during the Hilary Clinton-Donald Trump presidential contest of 2016, 237
bodes ill for even the Dreamers whom Trump and Biden personally would
support.
Setting aside the truism that even presidents as different as Trump
and Biden relish exercising strong executive power to advance their
policies,238 the fact remains that our half-hearted constitutional commitment
to a robust public education for all as evidenced in Brown, Rodriguez, and
Plyler make passage of any Dream Act an uphill climb.

235. Ross Douthat, Did Trump Make Everything Progressive?, N.Y. TIMES (May 4,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/04/opinion/trump-progressives.html?action=click
&module=Opinion&pgtype=Homepage [https://perma.cc/KDU7-DWC8] (“[The Trump]
administration’s mix of haplessness and menace was a great gift to progressivism, inspiring
an anti-conservative reaction that extended through every walk of elite life, turning centrists
into liberals and remaking liberalism into exactly the kind of progressive orthodoxy that
conservatives most fear.”).
236. Weiyi Cai and Ford Fessenden, Immigrant Neighborhoods Shifted Red as the
Country Chose Blue, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2020/12/20/us/politics/election-hispanics-asians-voting.html [https://perma.cc/MZG8-CHR
B] (“Across the United States, many areas with large populations of Latinos and residents of
Asian descent, including ones with the highest numbers of immigrants, had something in
common this election: a surge in turnout and a shift to the right, often a sizable one.”); see
also Musa al-Gharbi, The Trump vote is rising among Blacks and Hispanics, despite the
conventional wisdom, NBC NEWS (Nov. 2, 2020) https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/
trump-vote-rising-among-blacks-hispanics-despite-conventional-wisdom-ncna1245787
[https://perma.cc/KNV7-YYMW] (“[I]t may be an error to look at Trump to explain these
patterns among voters of color, as they could just as much be a product of minorities’
dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party.”).
237. Voters’ Attitudes About Race and Gender Are Even More Divided Than in 2016,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/09/10/votersattitudes-about-race-and-gender-are-even-more-divided-than-in-2016/ [https://perma.cc/87D
9-ZJUB] (noting that general division of voter attitudes is greater now than in 2016).
238. See Madeleine Carlisle, Why Biden’s Justice Department Is Backing Trump-Era
Positions, TIME (June 15, 2021) https://time.com/6073594/merrick-garland-trump/
[https://perma.cc/L6EE-P7P4] (quoting Barbara McQuade’s view that Biden’s Justice
Department might protect Trump-era positions “[not] because they favor Trump, but because
they favor strong executive power . . . .”).
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Whether such a belief be Sisyphean or Pollyannish, my hope is that
over time, a majority of our people will recognize that it is in our best
interests to ensure that all our children—whether Black, Brown, or white;
citizen, immigrant, or undocumented; rich or poor—have post-secondary
opportunities to work, study, and contribute to the greater good. Our
constitutional commitment to equal protection should demand no less.

